Violence and Democracy

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Abstract

The relationship between violence and democracy is an enduring theme in political science. We know that civil war, revolution, and state repression are much less likely under democratic rule, but how do we get from such violence to democracy? We draw upon Sarah Zukerman Daly's book, *Violent Victors: Why Bloodstained Parties Win Postwar Elections*, to explore these questions. Daly addresses the enigma of belligerent parties, often marred by heinous atrocities, emerging victorious in post-war elections. She shows how such violent victors triumph by playing on their capacity to provide security. We broaden out from Daly's focus on post-war democratization to consider the prospects for democracy in the wake of state repression and revolution. Our review finds that voters may be less forgiving of violent state repression compared to civil war violence; political parties emerging from civil wars and state repression face cognate yet distinct challenges; and social revolutionary violence poses more serious and durable threats to democratization than violence from civil wars and state repression. These findings underscore the need for a wider research agenda that investigates the diverse forms of social and political violence and their implications for democracy.

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Violence and democracy sit as antipodes. While there are certainly democracies with relatively high levels of social violence—the United States among them—the chances of being caught in a civil war or a downdraft of state repression fall dramatically with democratic rule.[1] These findings, however, raise more puzzles than they solve. What allows some bloody histories to be overcome when others persist or fall to recidivism? How is violence sublimated into democratic political orders that reduce it? And what longer-term legacies do violence–whether from civil war, social revolution, or state repression–have on subsequent political life?

Sarah Zukerman Daly raises all of these questions and more in an outstanding new book with a highly counterintuitive title: *Violent Victors: Why Bloodstained Parties Win Postwar Elections*.[2] Her preoccupation is civil war and a troubling regularity: that a surprising number of combatant parties in civil wars—even those tainted with horrific atrocities—compete successfully in transitional elections and even attract support from their victims. She argues that successful combatants can rebrand and market themselves as effective providers of security precisely because of their success on the battlefield. As she admits, her findings prove a mixed blessing. While forestalling a return to fighting would appear an unmitigated good, the legacies she describes present enduring challenges for transitional justice and even the ability of democracies to survive intact.

Daly's book has a number of methodological innovations that make it stand out, including carefully crafted cross-national evidence and strong case studies of civil war in three Central American countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. One of the book's biggest contributions, however, is in blending work on civil war with a consideration of the political strategies of parties and a behavioral analysis of voters. How do parties in post-conflict settings position themselves and how do voters respond to their electoral appeals?

In this review, we first locate the book within a wider literature on the aftermath of violent civil conflict. However, countries that democratize after civil war constitute a relatively small share of all democratic transitions and capture the effects of only one form of violence. To gain further analytic leverage on the consequences of violence broadly conceived, we connect the civil war literature to a parallel body of work on state repression and its political legacies, sustaining Daly's focus on parties and voters as key actors. An important finding is that parties in such settings are often weighted with significant authoritarian baggage and voters are less forgiving of state repression. Finally, Daly rightly looks for silver linings: ways that violence may be sublimated into democratic rule. But her work invites comparison to the revolutionary paths explored in new work by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way[3] in which violent conflict sets the stage not for democracy—however flawed—but for parties that usher in enduring authoritarian rule.

SOME NOTES ON METHOD

Before beginning, we need to clear some conceptual and methodological brush and also define the scope of our inquiry. When we talk about violence, we mean physical activities that have the effect of killing, injuring, or physically intimidating. These actions may be purposeful or arise as second-order effects of other violent activities or government neglect. For example, famines that occur in the context of civil war or as a result of government malfeasance–the Ukrainian famine under Stalin, and the Great Leap famine under Mao–are rightly seen as a form of violence.

For our purposes, we identify two non-mutually exclusive sources of violence: civil war and conflict, including revolutions, and state repression. Civil conflict and state repression do not exhaust forms of violence, which might be subsumed under still higher-level concepts such as "contention." Nonetheless, this narrowing of the scope of inquiry leaves plenty to consider. The two are not mutually exclusive because civil conflict not only results in violence through fighting but also through repression and terrorism by governments

[1] Christian Davenport and Benjamin J. Appel, *The Death and Life of State Repression: Understanding Onset, Escalation, Termination, and Recurrence*, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022); Barbara F. Walter, *How Civil Wars Start: And How to Stop Them* (New York: The Crown Publishing Group, 2022).

[2] Sarah Zukerman Daly, *Violent Victors: Why Blood-Stained Parties Win Postwar Elections*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2022).

[3] Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, *Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton university press, 2022).

and insurgents in the areas under their control. Yet, there is ample state repression in the absence of civil war, ranging from genocides and massacres to torture, disappearances, physical intimidation, and mass arrests of political opponents.

The main outcomes of interest are easily stated: how can we get from violence to peace and stable democratic rule?[4] These outcomes raise issues of measurement. But they are not insurmountable at the national level as we have ample indices of democracy, and the return of fighting is easily observed. As we discuss in more detail below, measurement gets more complicated when we descend from the national to the individual level of analysis, where Daly makes some particularly important contributions.

How are the effects of such violence studied? We see two major tracks, with Daly both combining them and adding a third. One, more traditional, compares jurisdictions, national or subnational.[5] These studies are interested in the effects of civil war on subsequent political outcomes, most notably the prospects for peace and democracy. The central challenge in these studies of violence–mostly cross-national in design–is the selection problem: the effects of civil war or state repression are hard to separate from the underlying factors that give rise to both in the first place. The new generation of work of this sort–including Daly–spends significant effort in addressing this issue through design-based econometric techniques, such as the use of instrumental variables, regression discontinuity, or difference-in-difference designs.

It is worth noting, however, that a number of studies–even a majority–*select* on civil war or the presence of state repression from the onset, effectively treating them as scope conditions. These studies can tease some causal effects out of the extent of violence across this population of civil war cases and quite naturally focus their attention on conditional factors that influence the political path out of conflict and repression. Whether these findings can be tied to concrete policy proposals capable of overcoming deep-seated, structural barriers to democratization is quite a different question.

The second strand of literature descends to the individual level, asking how personal exposure to violence affects political behavior and attitudes through experimental, quasi-experimental, or survey designs.[6] By one estimate, half of all country-years of civil conflict experienced less than 200 combatant deaths and over 40 percent of years of ongoing conflict did not involve one-sided violence against civilians.[7] Though undoubtedly critical junctures in a country's politics and society, civil conflict in itself does not necessarily expose civilians to a broad and exceptionally high level of violence. By contrast, with the pioneering work of Rudolph J. Rummel, we know that state repression is responsible for a greater share of human misery than not only civil wars and terrorism but even all international conflicts combined as well.[8]

An ongoing issue for such studies–and attempting to summarize them–is that "exposure to violence" can be measured in a variety of ways. One is geographical but runs the risk of ecological fallacy. We can isolate the effects of living in areas of a country that are more exposed to violence, but with the risk that any given person in a jurisdiction may still be more or less exposed. Although we are getting more sophisticated

[4] Stephan Haggard and Lydia Tiede, "The Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings: The Empirical Record," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (2014): 405–17; Robert A. Blair, "UN Peacekeeping and the Rule of Law," *American Political Science Review* 115, no. 1 (2021): 51–68. Kathryn Sikkink, *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Persecutions Are Changing World Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011); Geoff Dancy et al., "Behind Bars and Bargains: New Findings on Transitional Justice in Emerging Democracies," *International Studies Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (2019); Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, "Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice," *International Security* 28, no. 3 (2004): 5–44.

[5] Virginia Page Fortna and Reyko Huang, "Democratization after Civil War: A Brush-Clearing Exercise," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 4 (2012): 801–8.

[6] Stefano Costalli and Andrea Ruggeri, "The Long-Term Electoral Legacies of Civil War in Young Democracies: Italy, 1946-1968," *Comparative Political Studies* 52, no. 6 (2019): 927–61; Nicola Fontana, Tommaso Nannicini, and Guido Tabellini, "Historical Roots of Political Extremism: The Effects of Nazi Occupation of Italy," *Journal of Comparative Economics* 51, no. 3 (2023): 723–43; Maria Angélica Bautista et al., "The Geography of Repression and Opposition to Autocracy," *American Journal of Political Science* 67, no. 1 (2023): 101–18.

[7] Thomas Edward Flores and Irfan Nooruddin, *Elections in Hard Times: Building Stronger Democracies in the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 155–56; Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman, "One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (2007): 233–46; Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 2014. "UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5–2014."

[8] Rudolph J. Rummel, *Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 91–92; Christian Davenport and Benjamin J. Appel, *The Death and Life of State Repression: Understanding Onset, Escalation, Termination, and Recurrence*, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 11.

solutions to this problem,[9] measuring exposure at the individual level is more precise. However, it necessarily engages different causal mechanisms of persistence. As Jacob Walden and Yuri M. Zhukov point out in an important essay, these may range from individual psychological processes like post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), exposure to media coverage of violent episodes (including through experimental treatments), and socialization within families with histories of victimization (i.e., passing painful histories from parents to children).[10]

The individual level of analysis also raises a variety of difficult questions about what the ultimate implications for democracy are. Outcomes of interest at the individual level range from behavior such as propensity to participate through voting or taking part in protests, to attitudes and preferences that may be in tension with one another. For example, there is counterintuitive evidence that violence can increase participation in the form of voting, civic associations, and other informal modes if institutions and structural conditions permit; victims take advantage of political opportunity and can become highly committed participants.[11] Yet, violence associated with civil conflict has also been associated with declining generalized or social trust, greater willingness to favor in-group over out-group citizens, and even polarization, all outcomes commonly known to be adverse for democracy.[12]

The big advantage of this shift in the level of analysis to the individual is that it provides microfoundations for comparative claims. It also lends itself to experimental and quasi-experimental designs that are well-specified, and thus in the methodological spirit of the moment. Yet, it is worth introducing several notes of caution. First, getting from the individual to the collective level is by no means straightforward; a finding about an individual's willingness to participate does not easily aggregate to happy national-level political processes and outcomes. Second, the turn to microlevel data typically positions researchers in particular country settings, raising questions about external validity and the portability of findings.[13] The perennial difficulties of getting strong causal identification are augmented by a general lack of pre-conflict baseline data relative to data observed in the post-conflict period.[14] Third, data on preferences and attitudes is notoriously brittle. We now know more and more about how behavioral and cognitive processes are anything but rational and coherent, and that there may even be a tradeoff between the precision with which one can specify an experimental design and the robustness of the results.

Daly makes an important contribution by adding a third unit of observation to the mix, building on a wider literature on how political parties emerge from civil war.[15] Nested between the national and individual levels of analysis are political parties and a cluster of questions about their organization, platforms, political

[9] For example, Yuri M. Zhukov, "Repression Works (Just Not in Moderation)," *Comparative Political Studies* 56, no. 11 (2023): 1663-1694.

[10] Jacob Walden and Yuri M. Zhukov, "Historical Legacies of Political Violence," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia: Politics.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). See also Pellumb Kelmendi and Amanda Rizkallah, "The Effects of Civil War on Post-War Political Development," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia: Politics.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

[11] For example, see Christopher Blattman, "From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda," *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 2 (2009): 231–47. See also John Bellows and Edward Miguel, "War and Institutions: New Evidence from Sierra Leone," *American Economic Review* 96, no. 2 (2006): 394–99; Pauline Grosjean, "Conflict and Social and Political Preferences: Evidence from World War II and Civil Conflict in 35 European Countries," *Comparative Economic Studies* 56 (2014): 424–51; Giacomo De Luca and Marijke Verpoorten, "Civil War and Political Participation: Evidence from Uganda," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 64, no. 1 (2015): 113–41.

[12] Robert Ralston and Ronald R. Krebs, "Democracy in the Crucible of Conflict," in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, by Robert Ralston and Ronald R. Krebs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Dominic Rohner, Mathias Thoenig, and Fabrizio Zilibotti, "Seeds of Distrust: Conflict in Uganda," *Journal of Economic Growth* 18, no. 3 (2013): 217–52; Price and Yaylacı, "What Exactly Are the Social and Political Consequences of Civil War?"; Sara Kijewski and Markus Freitag, "Civil War and the Formation of Social Trust in Kosovo: Posttraumatic Growth or War-Related Distress?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 4 (2018): 717–42.

[13] Kelmendi and Rizkallah, "The Effects of Civil War on Post-War Political Development."

[14] Ralston and Krebs, "Democracy in the Crucible of Conflict."

[15] John Ishiyama and Anna Batta, "Swords into Plowshares: The Organizational Transformation of Rebel Groups into Political Parties," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 44, no. 4 (2011): 369–79; Jeroen de Zeeuw, ed., *From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements after Civil War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008); Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs and Sophia Hatz, "Rebel-to-Party Transformations in Civil War Peace Processes 1975–2011," *Democratization* 23, no. 6 (2016): 990–1008; Carrie Manning, "Party-Building on the Heels of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo and Mozambique," *Democratization* 14, no. 2 (2007): 253–72; Carrie Manning and Ian Smith, "Political Party Formation by Former Armed Opposition Groups after Civil War," *Democratization* 23, no. 6 (2016): 972–89; Michael E. Allison, "The Transition from Armed Opposition to Electoral Opposition in Central America," *Latin American Politics and Society* 48, no. 4 (2006): 137–62.

appeals, and linkage to voters. Just as Daly analyzes how political parties seek to position themselves politically in the aftermath of violent conflict, we can ask how authoritarian successor parties emerge from contexts of state repression, seeking to blunt the risks of retribution. As we will see, the strategies of these authoritarian successor parties and their effects can vary wildly, partly a function of the nature and extent of past violence and differ yet again from parties that attain political power through steering successful social revolutions.

SITUATING DALY: CIVIL WAR VIOLENCE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY

Daly focuses her attention on transitional elections and the long-standing finding—or aspiration—that elections provide an antidote to civil war. As Daly puts it, "allowing ballots should diminish any resort to bullets."[16] In fact, this finding generates an immediate puzzle that has defined the vast and continuing literature on how civil wars end: the problem that some civil wars yield relatively more democratic outcomes than others. Most work on the relationship between civil war and democracy at the national level adopts the research design noted above: they select on civil war–treating it as a scope condition–and explore variation in other parameters that influence successful settlement.

The causal factors of interest do include characteristics of the violence itself, such as its intensity and duration. But much of this work focuses on other factors that can positively or negatively affect democratic outcomes; not coincidentally some of those factors are considered manipulable. Although well beyond the scope of our inquiry here, we cite two examples to clarify the point: the work on the role of outside actors; and the equally large literature on constitutional engineering. An important early contribution by Barbara F. Walter found that monitoring and enforcement by third parties can alleviate the credible commitment problem critical to post-war democratization and the maintenance of peace.[17] A second strand, cautious that negotiated settlement alone would improve prospects for democracy and peace, honed in on institutional factors such as the timing of elections or the details of constitutional and electoral design.[18] Transitions to democracy and peace were more likely where institutions were appropriately crafted.

Newer work, however, has addressed these issues in a quite different way by descending to the individual level, looking at the effects of civil war on individual behaviors and attitudes: voting, participation, and even factors such as social trust. In her pioneering ethnographic work on El Salvador, Elizabeth J. Wood shows how victims of state violence during the civil war in El Salvador developed a particular moral economy, stoking greater support for and participation in opposition politics.[19] Starting in the mid-2000s a new spate of work in this vein began to crop up, led by economists as well as political scientists.[20] Taking stock of these studies in a wide-ranging review essay in 2016, Michal Bauer and his colleagues found, for example, that "the data strongly reject the common view that communities and people exposed to war violence will inevitably be deprived of social capital, collective action, and trust."[21] Across sixteen studies–and from an array of disciplines including political science, economics, psychology, and anthropology–violence was associated with a willingness to cooperate, sometimes using behavioral games and experiments as well as survey data. However, this work also found that exposure to wartime violence may also have parochial effects, for example, fostering only in-group altruism rather than toward the out-group or proving limited to

[16] Daly, *Violent Victors*, 5.

[17] Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (1997): 335–64. See also, Gurses and Mason, "Democracy Out of Anarchy"; Joshi, "Post-Civil War Democratization"; Leonard Wantchekon, "The Paradox of 'Warlord' Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation," *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 1 (2004): 17–33; Leonard Wantchekon and Zvika Neeman, "A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 14, no. 4 (2002): 439–64.

[18] See, for instance, Thomas Edward Flores and Irfan Nooruddin, *Elections in Hard Times: Building Stronger Democracies in the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Aila M. Matanock, *Electing Peace: From Civil Conflict to Political Participation*, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

[19] Elizabeth Jean Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[20] Most notably, Blattman, "From Violence to Voting"; Bellows and Miguel, "War and Institutions."

[21] Michal Bauer et al., "Can War Foster Cooperation?," Journal of Economic Perspectives 30, no. 3 (2016): 271.

more local and informal forms of participation.[22]

We are particularly interested in studies that focus directly on features of the conflict and violence itself, which can shape the incentives of warring party elites to seek democratic post-war settlements. Surprisingly, there is no consensus on the effects of the intensity of civil war violence on post-war democratization. Disagreements arise in part from different understandings of what a "costlier war" means to the parties involved. One approach to capturing the intensity of violence focuses on things like the number of battle deaths or displacement[23] and the number of violent events by geographical unit.[24] However, it is possible that long periods of low-intensity wartime violence can be equally if not more deleterious on the prospects for democracy.[25] Despite some recent exceptions, variations in the duration and intensity of wartime violence have generally been under-theorized and treated as control variables, including in Daly's book.[26] Some have even cast doubt on the presence of any causal effect from either conflict intensity or duration on post-conflict democracy.[27]

However costs of war are measured, it is not obvious what the expected direction of a causal effect should even be.[28] The "exhaustion" model suggests that costlier wars incentivize elites to agree to power-sharing arrangements and hence facilitate post-war democratization.[29] Yet, more intense, longer conflicts can–quite intuitively–have a host of adverse consequences by reducing candidates' time horizons, undermining social trust, and even incentivizing the use of electoral violence.[30] The difficulty of reaching firm conclusions is compounded by a host of selection issues, such as the fact that wars with low-level intensity tend to be ethnic wars, which last longer and are less likely to end in peace agreements, negotiated settlements, or one-sided victories.[31] The duration and intensity of violence are not easily manipulable, and perhaps for that reason, the civil war literature has appropriately focused on conditional claims about factors that may lead to normatively preferable outcomes.

VIOLENT VICTORS

Daly engages this literature in a somewhat lateral way, navigating between the national and individual levels by focusing on political parties. First, she builds on a debate about whether one-sided military victory, in particular those won by a rebel group, improves the prospects for post-war democratization or not.[32] Showing the value of arbitraging across international relations and comparative politics, she presents a simple balance-of-power model of the conditions under which elections are stabilizing. That model follows directly from a cognate literature on war termination in international relations; in this sense, the outcome of the war matters. Combatants fight until one side wins or—more typically—the balance of capabilities is adequately revealed to force a settlement on the terms of the more powerful party. Daly extrapolates to argue that if victorious belligerents win in postwar elections, then neither side will have an incentive to

[22]Christopher G. Price and Şule Yaylacı, "What Exactly Are the Social and Political Consequences of Civil War? A Critical Review and Analysis of Recent Scholarship," *Civil Wars* 23, no. 2 (2021): 283–310; De Luca and Verpoorten, "Civil War and Political Participation: Evidence from Uganda."

[23]Virginia Page Fortna and Reyko Huang, "Democratization after Civil War: A Brush-Clearing Exercise," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 4 (2012): 801–8; Flores and Nooruddin, *Elections in Hard Times*.

[24]Kijewski and Freitag, "Civil War and the Formation of Social Trust in Kosovo"; Michael Weintraub, Juan F Vargas, and Thomas E. Flores, "Vote Choice and Legacies of Violence: Evidence from the 2014 Colombian Presidential Elections," Research & Politics 2, no. 2 (2015): 1–8; Rohner et al., "Seeds of Distrust."

[25]Madhav Joshi, "Post-Civil War Democratization: Promotion of Democracy in Post-Civil War States, 1946–2005," *Democratization* 17, no. 5 (2010): 826–55; Mehmet Gurses and T. David Mason, "Democracy Out of Anarchy: The Prospects for Post-Civil-War Democracy," *Social Science Quarterly* 89, no. 2 (2008): 315–36.

[26]Kelmendi and Rizkallah, "The Effects of Civil War on Post-War Political Development."

[27]Fortna and Huang, "Democratization after Civil War."

[28]Flores and Noorudin, *Elections in Hard Times*.

[29]Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007); Gurses and Mason, "Democracy Out of Anarchy"; Joshi, "Post-Civil War Democratization."

[30]Flores and Noorudin, *Elections in Hard Times*.

[31]Flores and Noorudin, *Elections in Hard Times*; Fontana et al., "Historical Roots of Political Extremism."

[32]Compare, for example, Monica Toft, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009) and Peter Wallenstein, *Quality Peace: Peacebuilding, Victory and World Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

challenge the new order. The victors can both deter challenges and suppress their own coercive impulses. The losers recognize that a return to fighting will yield the same outcome and acquiesce in the hope of living to fight another day but through competitive elections.

However, Daly's ultimate interest is not only—or even primarily—in the conditions that generate democratic outcomes. Rather, she wants to explain the perverse *behavioral* dimensions of the democratization process at the party and individual levels. How can a party that victimized the population in pursuit of its war aims be seen as competent with respect to security issues? And how does such a party credibly claim that it will abstain from abuse of the levers of power once in office? How, in short, do you get "violent victors": blood-stained parties that nonetheless secure majority support?

Daly assumes a settlement on terms set by the victor and divides the post-civil-war space into three dominant party types, taking into account that electoral rules will shape the number of parties entering the democratic game. First are non-belligerents: parties that were not directly engaged in the conflict and can thus claim clean hands concerning human rights issues. These parties are "rule abiders," and run on such platforms and other valence issues such as the economy.

Among the belligerents, Daly focuses on the differences between those who prevailed—typically the government forces, but sometimes the insurgents—and those who lost in the conflict itself. She argues that across the civil war settings she studies, parties emanating from either government or insurgent combatants account for over 55 percent of total votes cast. The striking claim is that winners are capable–albeit narrowly–of remaking their reputations if they can pull off a particular sleight of hand: to shift the public's attention from the suffering caused by the war to the benefits victors can provide for maintaining the peace.[33] This legerdemain requires the winning party to do two things: to emphasize its capacity to provide security while at the same time signaling future restraint.

The latter task cannot rest on cheap talk alone. To be credible, Daly outlines a series of steps parties need to take: reaching out to those harmed, purging ranks, restructuring the party's coercive apparatus, and recruiting new faces. But because of the emphasis that voters place on security following the exhaustion of war, these parties can prove surprisingly competitive vis-à-vis both non-belligerents and those combatants who lost. Indeed, according to Daly, the latter are reduced to tactical moves to differentiate themselves from the non-belligerents and winners that are better positioned to compete in the wake of conflict.

The theoretical approach combines rationalist and behavioral elements, with psychological processes at the level of the voter playing a central role. Building on a formal behavioral model, Daly outlines a rational strategy for each of the postwar parties: from the nature of the platform to the voters the parties target, to the candidates that they select to run. She does not rule out off-equilibrium approaches–for example, a victorious party running on a platform of contrition–but expects that they will gain less political traction.

In the end, it is the voter who needs to be brought around and a major innovation of the book is tracking down the logic underpinning the vote for a violent victor. Doing this is no mean feat, and a chapter on Colombia shows off the book's behavioral foundations to a particularly strong effect. Daly fields a face-to-face random survey of about 1,500 victims and non-victims of the country's decades-long civil war, thus allowing a direct comparison across exposure to violence. She then uses survey experiments to get at voter preoccupations under different electoral cues.

Unlike many such experiments in which there is reason to doubt the value of made-up vignettes, the experiments rest on observed differences in party strategies. For example, she considers citizen responses to cues about a candidate that simply report brutalities—assassinations to be precise—and those that report them in the context of a claim that the actions improved security and reduced violence. The security narrative strengthens voter willingness to see the violence as justified and correspondingly reduces demands for punishment. A narrative experiment tests the effects of various accounts of how the war started and was conducted, including a comparison of citizen responses to strong, unapologetic justifications for the violence versus cues emphasizing contrition. Although not a majority of respondents, the share willing to entertain a narrative justifying extensive violence—implicitly extending to atrocities—is striking. Observational findings support these experiments, and in some ways even more directly. Daly expected security-oriented voters to

[33] Daly, *Violent Victors*, 31.

have distinctive preferences, but across the entire sample she found the long shadow cast by the disruption of war: 90 percent supported the militarization of policing; 87 percent supported rougher handling of security threats from both rebels and criminals, over half claiming that violations of human rights were justified to stamp out guerillas, political violence, and terrorism. These simple descriptive statistics make a powerful point: in post-conflict settings, the demand for order–and tolerance for the Hobbesian bargain–appears strikingly high.

The case studies are built around a comparison of three different outcomes: El Salvador ended in a military draw, but in Nicaragua, the insurgents triumphed, and in Guatemala the government. Drawing on a wide array of sources, including internal party documents, personal interviews, and text-as-data analysis of campaign materials, Daly shows how victors both portray themselves–and apparently believe–that their capacity to terminate the conflict and win the peace will offset their violent pasts. She walks through how party strategies affect the selection of appropriate candidates in each case, and most importantly how voters in the three countries formed attitudes toward the competing parties.

Despite the innovations in the Colombia field experiments and extraordinarily rich information brought to bear in the case studies, a short chapter (Chapter Nine, "Implications for Postwar Peace, Justice, Democracy and Governance") relying on standard cross-national quantitative designs raises many of the questions posed above about moving across levels of analysis. As Daly acknowledges, her focus up to that point is "to explain the results of the first postwar elections: who wins, who loses, how and why."[34] What about the longer run?

Daly's Civil War Successor Party dataset permits an answer to this question, packed into a short but crucial several pages.[35] She finds that 14 percent of war losers gained power during the postwar period. Reverting to the reporting of simple regularities, Daly finds that 28 of 31 cases comport with the model. So far so good. But she also finds that an increase in the violent victors' vote totals in the transitional election is associated with both a greater likelihood that amnesty is granted to the victors, effectively avoiding accountability, and a small but nonetheless statistically significant reduction in democracy in the five years following the election.

Moreover, the two "violent victor" cases–Nicaragua and Guatemala–are notorious examples of democratic backsliding. Whether this can be traced back to the civil war, through the transitional elections to more contemporary developments–beginning around 1995 in Nicaragua and 2017 in Guatemala–goes far beyond our purposes here; Daly touches on these issues only in passing.[36] But whatever important benefits were gained by avoiding a return to fighting, they did not necessarily translate into robust democratic outcomes over the longer run. This crucial fact raises the question of the real determinants of democratization in these cases and the possibility that there are deeper structural factors giving rise both to civil war and the difficulty of consolidating democratic rule.

Daly ends the book on a rather positive note, but partly by returning to the literature on the role of external intervention in tilting domestic political processes in more or less favorable directions. Although Daly does not claim empirical validation for these policy implications in the book, plausible examples include external intervention to sustain a balance of power among warring groups and reducing the perceived urgency of security issues by improving the quality of public safety. Many important questions about the longer-run effects of violence on the prospects for democracy are necessarily left to future research.

LEGACIES OF STATE REPRESSION

Daly advances our knowledge of the partisan and voter dynamics following civil wars. There is now a parallel literature on the legacies of state repression that occurs outside of civil wars as well as within them. This work asks how genocides, state terror, mass deportations, ethnic cleansing, and other large-scale episodic violence shape political preferences and behavior, with those effects sometimes being transmitted across

[34] Daly, *Violent Victors*, 240.
[35] Daly, *Violent Victors*, 242-245.
[36] Daly, *Violent Victors*, 190-192, 206-209.

multiple generations.[37] We pose the same questions as we did to Daly's work: how does repression affect transitions to democratic rule? How do emergent parties position themselves in their wake, and how do voters respond to legacies of violence? We start with the individual-level findings and build out from those to the cross-national ones, including how authoritarian successor parties position themselves.

As is usual in any new field of study, we find null, mixed, and context-dependent results. However, a frequent empirical pattern is that victims of state repression are not as forgiving towards perpetrators as Daly finds in the immediate aftermath of civil war violence. Studies find evidence for voter aversion to former state perpetrators that even continues for multiple generations after the incidents of repression occurred. Examples abound. Maria Angélica Bautista and co-authors demonstrate that counties which underwent more killings and forced disappearances during Pinochet's rule had higher shares of "no" votes against Pinochet in Chile's 1988 plebiscite–even if those effects did not persist following the transition to democracy.[38] Noam Lupu and Leonid Peisakhin show that descendants of deported Ukrainian Tatars who were exposed to more violence in the process identified more strongly with their ethnic group, but also participated more in politics and were more hostile to Russia.[39] More broadly, Ukrainian communities that underwent more intense mass deportation in the 1940s remained less likely to vote for parties with pro-Russian positions as recently as 2014. Arturas Rozenas and co-authors similarly find that Ukrainian localities that underwent more intense mass deportation to Siberia in the 1940s are now less likely to vote for parties with pro-Russian positions.[40] Using a series of surveys in Taiwan between 1990 and 2017, Fang-Yi Chiou and Ji Yeon Hong explore the legacies of the February 28 Incident of 1947, during which the Kuomintang (KMT) unleashed a wave of violence against potential opponents. They find that cohorts with direct or even indirect experience of the incident still reject the KMT's more pro-China positions, identify themselves as Taiwanese, and are much less likely to vote for KMT's presidential candidates.[41]

Daly's main focus and empirical tests concern the immediate aftermath of civil war violence; she acknowledges that over the longer run, voters' relative prioritization of security provision over justice is likely to erode.[42] The state repression literature, however, raises the interesting question of how political preferences and behavior may persist, even over very much longer time frames. Some of this research focuses on familial socialization[43] while others take up characteristics of locales, such as local governments that nurture collective memories of the violence.[44]

But for our purposes, the more important question is why we might get disparate results across different types of violence: are citizens in post-civil war contexts willing to tolerate and even reward "violent victors," and victims of state repression more likely to punish them? One possible answer lies in important differences in the nature of the violence and the effects of those differences on the capacity to attribute accountability. In times of civil war, violence is two- or multi-sided and there may be multiple actors responsible for the violence. As a result, it may be harder for voters to gauge who is responsible for the violence and electorally punish them. Authoritarian state repression during non-wartime situations is more one-sided. Compared to victims of wartime violence, those who suffered from violent authoritarian repression can clearly identify

[37] See, for example, Bautista et al., "The Geography of Repression and Opposition to Autocracy"; Arturas Rozenas, Sebastian Schutte, and Yuri Zhukov, "The Political Legacy of Violence: The Long-Term Impact of Stalin's Repression in Ukraine," *The Journal of Politics* 79, no. 4 (2017): 1147–61; Jacob Walden and Yuri M. Zhukov, "Historical Legacies of Political Violence," in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, by Jacob Walden and Yuri M. Zhukov (Oxford University Press, 2020); Yuri M Zhukov and Roya Talibova, "Stalin's Terror and the Long-Term Political Effects of Mass Repression," *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 2 (2018): 267–83; Noam Lupu and Leonid Peisakhin, "The Legacy of Political Violence across Generations," *American Journal of Political Science* 61, no. 4 (2017): 836–51; Fang-Yi Chiou and Ji Yeon Hong, "The Long-Term Effects of State Repression on Political Behavior and Attitudes: Evidence from Taiwan," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 21, no. 3 (2021): 427–48.

[38] Bautista et al., "The Geography of Repression and Opposition to Autocracy."

[39] Lupu and Peisakhin, "The Legacy of Political Violence across Generations."

[40] Rozenas, Schutte, and Zhukov, "The Political Legacy of Violence."

[41] Chiou and Hong, "The Long-Term Effects of State Repression on Political Behavior and Attitudes."

[42] Daly, *Violent Victors*, 280.

[43] Laia Balcells, "The Consequences of Victimization on Political Identities: Evidence from Spain," *Politics & Society* 40, no. 3 (September 2012): 311–47; Rachel Lev–Wiesel, "Intergenerational Transmission of Trauma across Three Generations: A Preliminary Study," *Qualitative Social Work* 6, no. 1 (2007): 75–94; Yuhua Wang, "The Political Legacy of Violence During China's Cultural Revolution," *British Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 2 (2021): 463–87.

[44] Francisco Villamil, "Mobilizing Memories: The Social Conditions of the Long-Term Impact of Victimization," *Journal of Peace Research* 58, no. 3 (2021): 399–416.

their tormentors and can be more effectively mobilized to channel their frustrations through vote choice.

A second possible interpretation would align with the framework of *Violent Victors*. Parallel to voters in Daly's theory, voters in democracies emerging from extensive state repression may differentiate across parties but in a somewhat different way than in the civil war context. To get at these interesting differences, it is worthwhile to turn from this individual-level finding back to the terrain Daly carves out: how we get from state repression to democracy and the role that parties and voters play in the process.

The post-civil-war democratization processes explored in *Violent Victors* constitute only a small fraction of all democratic transitions, most of which occur through either mass mobilization from below or elite calculations and conflicts. In *Dictators and Democrats*, Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman address the question that state repression might play in these wider democratization processes.[45] They build on the work of Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, showing how non-violent protest can prove a powerful solvent for authoritarian rule.[46] In one chapter on "Transition Paths and the Quality of Democracy" (Ch. 5), they find that more authoritarian regimes that transition to democracy–regimes that are presumably more repressive–are more likely to transition through mass mobilization. This finding suggests a counterintuitive dialectic in which the path to democracy via non-violent mobilization is more likely to occur in more repressive settings. Moreover, they report statistically significant differences between transitions characterized by mass mobilization and those directed by elites: the former do better with respect to democracy and the protection of civil and political liberties, at least over the intermediate run.

Following Daly, what role might political parties play in these processes? Following earlier work in the transitions literature,[47] we can distinguish democratic transitions where the outgoing authoritarian regime and its elites were thoroughly discredited and displaced from cases where they managed to maintain their presence in the party system and even achieve electoral success. The former are weighed down by various forms of authoritarian baggage: not only legacies of state repression but poor economic performance, corruption, and defeats in war (e.g., Greek military dictatorship 1967-1974, Argentine military dictatorship 1976-1983). A simple hypothesis is that the greater the authoritarian baggage, the greater the makeover required, and the more challenging for authoritarian successor parties to garner electoral support.

James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring, like Daly, find that histories of repressive rule do not necessarily preclude subsequent political success, however: 47 out of 65 third-wave democracies have had authoritarian successor parties (ASPs) that won at least 10 percent in a nationwide democratic election.[48] That may be a low bar, but why is that share still so high? Moreover, ASPs in 35 countries have even elected their candidates to a presidential or prime ministerial position.

The burgeoning literature on authoritarian successor parties emphasizes another route to power. This route is not affected only by the "baggage quotient," nor Daly's emphasis on party strategies. Rather, these parties enjoy significant institutional and organizational advantages vis-a-vis their opponents, who are typically crippled by years of state repression.[49] At the institutional level, authoritarian holdover constitutions and exit guarantees that occur in the process of negotiating democratic transitions have had an effect. These arrangements help former authoritarian elites reserve legislative seats, mal-apportion legislatures, write favorable electoral rules, obtain local spheres of influence, and even ban select political parties.[50]

[45] Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, *Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites and Regime Change* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).

[46] Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

[47] Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[48] James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring, eds., *Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide*, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

[49] See, for example, Herbert Kitschelt and Matthew Singer, "Linkage Strategies of Authoritarian Successor Parties," in *Life after Dictatorship*, ed. James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 53–83; T. J. Cheng and Teh-fu Huang, "Authoritarian Successor Parties in South Korea and Taiwan: Authoritarian Inheritance, Organizational Adaptation, and Issue Management," in *Life after Dictatorship*, ed. James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 84–112.

[50] Michael Albertus, "The Fate of Former Authoritarian Elites Under Democracy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 3 (2019): 727–59; Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, "Dealing with Dictators: Negotiated Democratization and the Fate of Outgoing Autocrats," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 3 (2014): 550–65.

Authoritarian successor parties closely associated with the prior authoritarian regime can also enjoy a variety of organizational advantages such as the inheritance of clientelistic networks, resources for party financing, territory-based organizations, control over the media, and other organizational infrastructure and connections.[51] Parties with greater territorial presence (e.g., "formal branch structures, informal patronage-based machines, or allied social movements") and more established ties with existing organizations such as churches and labor unions have advantages in campaigning, party financing, and mobilizing voters on the ground.[52] And not all ASPs are saddled with baggage: some ASPs also inherit positive legacies of governance experience and policy performance from the authoritarian period.[53]

Though Daly's focus is not on authoritarian successor parties per se, the significance of "authoritarian inheritance," especially in the form of media control, is echoed in her book. As one illustrative example, El Salvador's civil war ended in a military draw, which according to Daly's theory should lead Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) and Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) to split the vote. However, ARENA, the authoritarian successor party, was able to outperform its rebel successor counterpart FMLN through its significant control over the media. Daly quotes the FMLN presidential candidate in 1994, Rubén Zamora: "They, [ARENA], had more propaganda than we did …. a powerful media apparatus …. They committed most of the crimes, but it didn't matter. Because …. they controlled all of the media, they could control the story."[54] Such observations led her to partially revise her theory for civil war cases that end in military draws, attributing a greater role to party capabilities, in this case, media control.

Daly's book shows that a focus on violent victors alone is like trying to hear the sound of one hand clapping. Violent victors gain traction in the context of other parties that face strategic disadvantages–namely, losing (rebel or government) belligerent parties and non-belligerent parties. What about parties that grow out of the various groups that opposed autocratic rule? We call these parties "opposition successor parties (OSPs)" and as in Daly, it is intriguing to think about their comparative advantages and disadvantages. There is a rich literature on rebel-to-party transformations, particularly factors contributing to their organization and electoral performance.[55] There is also extensive work on communist successor parties in Central and Eastern Europe and the conditions under which they were able to rehabilitate themselves.[56] Extensive work has also been done on how different types of rebel governance structures (e.g., provision of public goods and social services) shape state-society relations and rebel-civilian linkages, and hence, the post-rebel party's ability to mobilize votes in subsequent elections.[57]

Although work on opposition successor parties that do not arise from civil wars is in relative infancy, it suggests that violence is implicated in the behavior of these parties as well. Just as the "legacies of civil war

[51]Kitschelt and Singer, "Linkage Strategies of Authoritarian Successor Parties"; Cheng and Huang, "Authoritarian Successor Parties in South Korea and Taiwan."

[52]Loxton and Mainwaring, eds., *Life after Dictatorship*, 11.

[53]Haggard and Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*; Ji Yeon Hong, Sunkyoung Park, and Hyunjoo Yang, "In Strongman We Trust: The Political Legacy of the New Village Movement in South Korea," *American Journal of Political Science*, 2022, 1–17.

[54]Daly, *Violent Victors*, 143.

[55]Carrie Manning and Ian Smith, "Political Party Formation by Former Armed Opposition Groups after Civil War," *Democratization* 23, no. 6 (2016): 972–89; Ishiyama and Batta, "Swords into Plowshare"; Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund, "Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development," *Choice Reviews Online* 46, no. 12 (2009); Jeroen de Zeeuw, From Soldiers to Politicians; Costalli and Ruggeri, "The Long-Term Electoral Legacies of Civil War in Young Democracies"; John T. Ishiyama and Gyda M. Sindre, eds., *The Effects of Rebel Parties on Governance, Democracy and Stability after Civil Wars: From Guns to Governing, Democratization and Autocratization Studies* (London: Routledge, 2023); Carrie Manning, "Party-Building on the Heels of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo and Mozambique," *Democratization* 14, no. 2 (2007): 253–72; Kalowatie Deonandan, David Close, and Gary Prevost, eds., "Revolutionaries to Parties: The Case of Mozambique," in *From Revolutionary Movements to Political Parties* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2007), 181–210.

[56]Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, *Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); John T. Ishiyama, "The Sickle or the Rose?: Previous Regime Types and the Evolution of the Ex-Communist Parties in Post-Communist Politics," *Comparative Political Studies* 30, no. 3 (1997): 299–330; Ishiyama and Batta, "Swords into Plowshares."

[57]Reyko Huang, *The Wartime Origins of Democratization: Civil War, Rebel Governance, and Political Regimes*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2016); Manning and Smith, "Political Party Formation by Former Armed Opposition Groups after Civil War"; John Ishiyama and Michael Widmeier, "From 'Bush Bureaucracies' to Electoral Competition: What Explains the Political Success of Rebel Parties after Civil Wars?," *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 30, no. 1 (2020): 42–63.

violence" literature examines variations in the duration or intensity of violence, this work is concerned with the effects of different types of state repression. One particular focus is violence that focuses strategically on some individuals or groups as opposed to that which is more indiscriminate and in which all opposition groups are vulnerable to repression. Opposition elites who share prior experiences as victims of highly targeted state repression tend to be more capable of maintaining high cohesion among themselves and mobilizing voters in elections. Insights from social identity theory have been used to explain these differences as well as outcomes such as the subsequent extent of polarization among opposition groups. Elizabeth R. Nugent provides an example. Like Daly, she is primarily concerned with the immediate transitional period than the longer run. Compared to Mubarak's Egypt where state repression was more targeted toward the Muslim Brotherhood, more widespread repression in Ben Ali's Tunisia helped construct shared political identities and contributed to lower political polarization. Higher cohesion among opposition forces between 1987 and 2010 enabled a more peaceful transfer of power and more robust democratic consolidation.[58]

Other studies specifically bring parties into the equation, again providing interesting points of comparison with Daly's work. For example, there is some evidence that co-optation or OSPs' prior collaboration with the authoritarian government may be consequential. Comparing the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, and extending it to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Zambia, and Brazil, Alanna C. Torres-Van Antwerp shows that formerly excluded and repressed opposition groups are more likely to succeed in mobilizing voters during (and after) the democratic founding election compared to parties co-opted by the autocratic regime.[59] The rationale is that groups that had been subject to harsher repression were forced to go underground during the autocratic period, and were thus incentivized to build a more independent, informal, and extensive grassroots presence, facilitating voter mobilization after the collapse of autocratic rule. Others including Adrienne LeBas and Yoonkyung Lee similarly find that greater exclusion and repression (as opposed to co-optation) of organized labor by the authoritarian regime unintentionally strengthens opposition parties in subsequent periods.[60] Clearly, there are interesting lines of comparison between parties that emerge in civil war settings and those that emerge in the wake of state repression more generally.

A THIRD CUT: REVOLUTION AND ENDURING AUTHORITARIAN RULE

So far, our review has reached at least somewhat hopeful conclusions: identifying circumstances under which violent pasts might be sublimated into democracy and peace or even have unexpected silver linings, for example by motivating political participation. Yet it is interesting to invert the question and ask whether there are circumstances in which violence has quite opposite effects, providing enduring advantages to authoritarian incumbents and shutting out opportunities for democratic outcomes altogether. New work by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way casts light on that question and suggests the settings in which incumbent parties brutally kill off oppositions and in so doing manage to achieve enduring monopolies on political power.

We have talked about civil war and state repression as sources of violence. Levitsky and Way consider a very particular form of social conflict: social revolution. They purposefully define social revolutions quite narrowly, and their definition yields only 20 cases. Social revolutions: occur from below as a result of mass-based movements outside the state and regime; they involve the violent overthrow of the old regime, whether through rapid seizures of power (as in Russia), more prolonged civil war (Mexico), or as a result of insurgencies (China or Cuba); they produce a fundamental transformation of the state, including a crippling of the existing coercive apparatus; and they involve the initiation of radical socioeconomic and even cultural change.

Levitsky and Way propose a theory about why these regimes may prove particularly durable that rests both on the type of violence that occurs in revolutions and the effects of that violence on the prospects

[58] Elizabeth Nugent, *After Repression: How Polarization Derails Democratic Transition, Princeton Studies in Political Behavior* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020).

[59] Alanna C. Torres-Van Antwerp, *Legacies of Repression in Egypt and Tunisia: Authoritarianism, Political Mobilization, and Founding Elections*, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022).

[60] Adrienne LeBas, *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Yoonkyung Lee, "2. Labor's Political Representation: Divergent Paths in Korea and Taiwan," in *Working through the Past: Labor and Authoritarian Legacies in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Teri L. Caraway, Maria Lorena Cook, and Stephan Crowley (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).

for opposition. Their theory takes the form of a reactive sequence, which starts with the fact that early radicalism triggers a violent counter-revolutionary reaction, often allied with outside political forces that choose to intervene. This reaction, however, constitutes an existential threat that serves to increase the cohesion of the elite, often through the vehicle of a single political party (many of which in the sample are Communist).

The counterrevolutionary reaction also serves the creation of a loyal coercive apparatus, and perhaps most importantly facilitates the complete destruction of rival organizations and independent sources of societal power. There are variants of the social revolution in which enduring authoritarian rule does not result, for example where the revolution is defeated by its opponents or where the revolutionary party is forced to moderate its objectives. But of the cases they identify, the simple regularities they report are strong: an overwhelming share of social revolutions fit their model–taking into account the deviant paths–and 75 percent conform precisely to the reactive sequence as defined.

What we get from considering this third set of cases is the sobering finding that violence can under certain circumstances preclude democratization altogether. Unlike Daly's violent victors or the authoritarian successor parties identified in the previous section, the elites and parties that sit atop these particular social conflicts seem immune–at least for long stretches of time–from the political dynamics of accommodation that we trace in many transitions from civil war and state repression. Parties are not vehicles for attracting voters in competitive or semi-competitive milieus but are rather instruments of recruitment, and above all surveillance, repression, social control, and sustained repression.

In closing out consideration of this path, it is worth returning to some findings at the individual level which yield some perverse twists. Yuhua Wang finds that individuals who grew up in localities that were exposed to more state-sponsored violence in the late 1960s in China–a classic revolutionary case–are less likely to engage in contentious political behavior.[61] In that sense, violence "works" for the political elite. Yet they are also less trusting of national political leaders and more critical of the country's political system, attitudes that Wang shows can be passed down across generations if parents are willing to talk about politics with their children.

Second, the consequences of exposure to violence in these revolutionary cases are clearly contingent on the political opportunity structure. Arturas Rozenas and Yuri M. Zhukov, for instance, find that those more exposed to violence in the former Soviet Union–including Ukraine–were more loyal toward Moscow during periods and in localities where the regime could credibly threaten retribution for anti-regime behavior; again, violence "worked."[62] But conversely, once these constraints were loosened, backlash effects arose, and the perpetrators of state repression were punished.[63]

CONCLUSION

A variety of conversations have sprung up over the last three decades that focus on the consequences of violence for subsequent political life. Some of these focus on national-level outcomes–peace and democracy–while an exciting new strand of work is exploring the effects of legacies of violence at the individual level, and how such legacies are transmitted and persist. Our purpose here is not to survey this terrain in its

[61] Yuhua Wang, "The Political Legacy of Violence during China's Cultural Revolution," *British Journal of Political Science* 51 (2021): 463-487.

[62] Arturas Rozenas and Yuri M. Zhukov, "Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin's 'Terror by Hunger,'" *American Political Science Review* 113, no. 2 (2019): 569–83; Arturas Rozenas, Sebastian Schutte, and Yuri Zhukov, "The Political Legacy of Violence: The Long-Term Impact of Stalin's Repression in Ukraine," *The Journal of Politics* 79, no. 4 (2017): 1147–61; Yuri M Zhukov and Roya Talibova, "Stalin's Terror and the Long-Term Political Effects of Mass Repression," *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 2 (2018): 267–83; Noam Lupu and Leonid Peisakhin, "The Legacy of Political Violence across Generations," *American Journal of Political Science* 61, no. 4 (2017): 836–51.

[63] Laia Balcells, "The Consequences of Victimization on Political Identities: Evidence from Spain," *Politics & Society* 40, no. 3 (September 2012): 311–47; Stefano Costalli and Andrea Ruggeri, "Forging Political Entrepreneurs: Civil War Effects on Post-Conflict Politics in Italy," *Political Geography* 44 (2015): 40–49; Vasiliki Fouka and Hans-Joachim Voth, "Collective Remembrance and Private Choice: German–Greek Conflict and Behavior in Times of Crisis," *American Political Science Review* 117, no. 3 (2023): 851–70; Rozenas and Zhukov, "Mass Repression and Political Loyalty"; Jason Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 3 (2009): 331–62.

entirety–an impossible task–but to point out how the question has not been posed in precisely that way: as an attempt to understand the effects of different types of political and social violence. Using Daly's *Violent Victors* as a jumping-off point, we have tried to put some of these findings in dialogue with one another.

Daly's work is of particular interest because her focus on parties and their strategies serves as a bridge between studies at the national level on transitions from civil war to democracy and behavioral research at the individual level. We have also suggested how Daly's take on these issues can be connected with the cognate literature on the legacies of state repression, including on authoritarian successor parties. We highlighted several findings of broader interest: that citizen reactions coming out of civil war violence and state repression may not be the same; that parties emerging from civil war and state repression face cognate, but nonetheless distinct challenges; and that social revolutionary violence may pose much greater challenges for democratic outcomes than even the difficult legacies of civil wars and state repression. These findings suggest a much wider research agenda on the varieties of collective violence and their consequences.

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