4

Determinants of State Strength and Capacity

Understanding Citizen Allegiance

JUAN ALBARRACÍN AND SARAH ZUKERMAN DALY

INTRODUCTION

At the end of civil wars, sovereignty is often divided, resting both with the state and with nonstate actors. Territories and populations are carved up and the government does not enjoy the allegiance of all of its citizens. Its use of violence and repression against sectors of society strips it of its legitimacy, and subsets of the population may have little trust in the state. When, during the conflict, the state ceases to protect all of its citizens and provide them public goods, it breaks its social contract with its people and leaves a vacancy for "rebel governments" to fill.[1]

Rebuilding the state in conflict areas is a critical task of post-conflict environments. One of the key objectives of such state-building efforts is to regain the loyalty of the people such that they turn to the state rather than to illegal nonstate actors for governance. In this way, reconstruction, extending the reach of the state, and improving attitudes toward the government all work to prevent the recurrence of violence and to bolster the state such that it remains relatively strong vis-à-vis any prospective armed threats.

It is this task that the Colombian government currently faces as it emerges from fifty years of civil strife and seeks to state-build across its territory. A key assumption underpinning the state-building policy in Colombia is that it must regain the loyalty of people long under rebel control and regain legitimacy among its population as a whole. This chapter contributes to these objectives by seeking to understand the determinants of people's degree of trust in and allegiance toward the state. From literatures on civil wars and state-building, it derives hypotheses to account for the marked variation in attitudes toward the state. It then engages in a preliminary evaluation of these individual and contextual level factors using survey data from nine years in Colombia. The results reveal that daily, personal experiences with state agents, for example, experiences of discrimination and corruption, and perceptions of government-provided public goods strongly shape citizens' trust in and allegiance toward state institutions. Thus, it is not only whether the state is present and capable of enforcing laws and providing public services but also *how* the state and its agents interact with the population that determines attitudes toward the state. The chapter concludes with implications of the analysis for policymaking in contemporary Colombia.

---

[1] On rebel governance, see Wickham-Crowley (1992, 228); Arjona et al. (2015); Arjona (2017); Mampilly (2011).

STATE BUILDING AND THE COLOMBIAN STATE

State capacity to effectively enforce rules and guarantee social order across the national territory is widely seen as the foundation for a peaceful society and insulation against civil war (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hobbes, 2010). Not surprisingly, state-building processes and the causes behind varying levels of state capacity across and within states have been the focus of considerable scholarly attention (Berwick and Christia, 2018). The evolution of state institutions is often traced to disputes between revenue-hungry rulers and subjects' attempts to limit rulers' extractive tendencies (Levi, 1988; North and Weingast, 1989; see also discussion in Berwick and Christia, 2018). Well-known contributions have pointed to international or internal instability as the source of greater state capacity. These approaches to state-building highlight how the anticipation of international wars or international rivalries prompt states to build institutions capable of extracting resources from populations (Tilly, 1990; Thies, 2005). In this view, the relative weakness of Latin American states is – in part – the result of the absence of these international pressures (Centeno, 2002). Furthermore, internal mass unrest can also incentivize state-building processes by fostering elites to coalesce and create or strengthen state institutions that protect their economic and political interests (Slater, 2010).[2]

Highlighting the limitations of these approaches to explain the considerable variation in state capacity in the developing world, particularly in Latin America, other authors have emphasized how legacies of colonial institutions, economic structures, and relationships between elites can account for variation in the levels of state capacity (Boone, 2003; Kurtz, 2013; Soifer, 2015). Countries based on labor-repressive agriculture at the outset of state-building processes, for example, are less likely to result in effective governmental institutions. Because local (rural) elites depend on localized forms of repression to sustain their more servile and less efficient forms of production, they have much to lose from the centralization of coercion and taxation and will resist them (Kurtz, 2013). Moreover, countries with multiple, strong economic centers at the beginning of state-building projects are also more likely to produce weaker states since regional elites have distinct interests and are less likely to coalesce around one national development and state-building project (Soifer, 2015).

---

[2] Internal instability can, but does not necessarily, lead to greater state capacity. In a forthcoming publication Soifer and Vieira (2019) show how the size and funding of the Peruvian armed forces – a dimension of the states' coercive capacity – were not sustained after the end of conflict. Some changes in the institutional design of the Peruvian security apparatus remained and there was greater territorial extension of the state.

The incorporation of local elites into the national state-building project or their substitution by bureaucracies aligned with national elites are deemed essential for successful state-building processes (Kurtz, 2013; Soifer, 2015). The ability of central authorities to effectively provide social order and enforce rules beyond the center requires the allegiance of peripheral elites, as well as knowledge about local populations. Building on the state-building literature, Giraudy and Luna (2017) see the construction of state capacity and its territorial and functional projection (i.e., state reach) as a result of bargaining between national level and local elites. Moreover, the capacity of the state to effectively project its power across the territory depends on its ability to collect and process information about its citizens in the periphery, i.e., legibility (Lee and Zhang, 2017; see also Scott, 1998).

The persistence of civil unrest in Colombia over the course of its history has frequently been attributed to the limited capacity and territorial reach of its state. By many theoretical accounts, Colombia was "predetermined" to be a weak state. After independence, for example, Colombia had strong regional centers with distinct economic and political interests (Palacios and Safford, 2002). These dispersed centers had little incentive to support a national, centripetal state-building process (Soifer, 2015). The resulting Colombian state has been described as "a form of indirect rule," in which national elites allow local elites to rule peripheries as they see fit – often through violent and exclusionary means – as long as they do not challenge the center (Robinson, 2013, 44; see also Daly, 2016).

The Colombian state is a highly uneven state, and in some dimensions, has grown stronger in the past decades (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2010). It has functioning and professional bureaucracies that effectively manage certain domains, such as its macro-economy. In a context of a worsening security situation, for example, the central government was able to push through temporary taxes on the wealthiest taxpayers to finance the build-up of the Colombian security forces (Flores-Macías, 2014). Today, Colombia has arguably among the most capable military forces in Latin America. Yet, as the central state grows more capable, regional and local elites still dominate social and political life in the country's rural peripheries. This "differential presence" of the (central) state (González, 2003) remains one of the greatest challenges to the achievement of peace in Colombia. While the central state reaches (most) citizens in its urban centers and is capable of enforcing its rules, the rural peripheries that were (are) the epicenter of much of the violence during the armed conflict do not fully experience the state as the guarantor of social order.

The state-building literature has mostly focused on the causes behind state-building processes (Soifer and Vom Hau, 2008; Hendrix, 2010; Luna and Soifer, 2017, to name a few examples), how relationships between elites at the national and local levels influence state building and strength, and the ways the state interacts with, penetrates, and reshapes (sometimes unsuccessfully) social groups and local communities (Mann, 1984; Migdal, 1988; Scott, 1998, see also discussion in Berwick and Christia, 2018). It has paid less attention to how (individual) citizens' views about the state and their support for state institutions impact state capacity and its ability to enforce its rules.[3] A look at the counter-insurgency literature provides some insights into how the population's support for the state may bolster its ability to effectively govern.

STATE CAPACITY BUILDING AS WINNING THE POPULATION'S ALLEGIANCE

The importance of winning back the population as a key ingredient of postwar state-building echoes the literatures on insurgency and counterinsurgency, which understand popular support and allegiances as critical to battlefield dynamics. As Mao Tse-Tung (1961, 44) wrote:

> Because guerilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation .... The former [the people] may be likened to water and the latter [the guerrillas] to the fish who inhabit it."

Thus, if the civilian populace constitutes the "sea" in which the combatant "fish" swim, counter-insurgent warfare "is a strategy that seeks to catch the fish by draining the sea" (Valentino, 2004, 200) either through indiscriminate killing of the insurgents' "peasant infrastructure and population resource"[4] or through positive inducements aimed at capturing noncombatants' hearts and minds.

---

[3] Our discussion here is limited to contributions in political science. Other disciplines, such as anthropology, have made valuable contributions to the study of the state (see, for example, Gupta [1995]).

It has become conventional wisdom that "counterinsurgency is fundamentally a struggle over people" (Berman et al., 2011) and that gaining the support of the population confers to a belligerent non-denunciation, critical information and intelligence, recruits, and sources of foodstuffs, shelter, and financial support (Berman et al., 2011). Wickham Crowley (1992) summarizes:

> The tripartite distinction of the combatant, the noncombatant, and the support and supply system is typically blurred in guerrilla war, unlike conventional war. Does the villager who carries potatoes to the guerrilla camp . . . constitute a military target? What about the peasant who lodges a guerrilla for a night (a common occurrence)? Or the peasant who serves as a lookout for the guerrillas? . . . Or those who . . . serve on sporadic or permanent peasant militias? . . . The peasantry has often mixed with the guerrillas in ways that makes the very hard indeed to distinguish.

During war, supportive populations provide the insurgents the human camouflage, materiel, and financial resources they require to survive. They enhance the strength of the rebels relative to the state, facilitating the rebels' own state-building enterprise, and undermining the state's hold on its territory. During such periods, the population may become, in the words of a Salvadoran rebel: "the unbeatable rearguard of the EPL, the 'mountain retreat' where the EPL fighters find a secure haven."[5]

So what happens after a peace agreement has been signed? How does the state win back the population that it has lost to the rebels? Legitimate states in the international system tend to have a monopoly over the means of violence in their borders and are the sole source of governance. It follows that gaining the trust and allegiance of the population is a critical part of the post-war state-building enterprise. To understand how, when, and where states are likely to have the loyalty of their people requires first understanding what determines variation in citizens' attitudes toward the state. To date, this has remained an underexplored question.

HYPOTHESES

We seek to explain variation in citizens' attitudes toward the state. What determines state legitimacy and citizens' allegiance to the state after war?

---

[4] Wickham-Crowley (1992, 80).

[5] Quoted in Menéndez (1983, 62).

A first approach to understanding variation in people's loyalty to and trust in the state focuses on the wartime dynamics of territorial control and assumes that the wartime dynamics carry into the postwar period. Specifically, the state competes over the hearts and minds of the population after war as it did during war, and the population tends to support the actor that enjoys consolidated territorial control. The fulfillment of the (arguably) quintessential function of the state – the maintenance of public order – is seen as a key determinant of support for the state (Bakke, 2011). In territories under state control, it is better equipped to guarantee a population's safety, which in turn generates support for the state. In places where it lacks an established presence, it fails to provide its citizens security and therefore loses legitimacy (Daly, 2018).

The importance of territorial control for winning back the population may be illustrated by Rio de Janeiro's program to gain access to communities controlled by drug trafficking organizations. Following a strategy of conditional repression (Lessing, 2015), the state first issued an ultimatum to the gangs to surrender, followed by a military invasion, and then the establishment of Pacifying Police Units (UPP): new, specially trained corps to provide around-the-clock community policing. The idea was that if the state could establish permanent territorial control over these favelas, the population would shift allegiance from the gangs to the state.

The international community's customary state-building recipe similarly calls for the recapture of state sovereignty in the aftermath of signed peace accords; that is, states should seek to regain legitimate, military, social, institutional, and political control over their entire territories, including zones that have been, often for long periods, under illegal armed group governance. Such reconstruction is a standard part of peace building; it is the "clear and hold" part of the conventional counterinsurgency practice (Daly, 2016).

From this literature, we should anticipate that where the state has *territorial control* and *strong military and police presence*, it will win the hearts and minds of the population.

While the literature on civil wars posits a relationship between allegiances and territorial control, the state capacity literature suggests that it is not just military control that matters, the "clear and hold" dimension, but also the "build" one. It is the development "invasion" in Rio de Janeiro in the form of the deployment of schools, health care, housing, and community-led poverty eradication initiatives that wins the state popular support.[6] It is providing economic benefits and development projects that earns them citizen loyalty (Beath et al., 2011; Berman et al., 2011). Provision of public goods and services should bolster support for states (Gilley, 2006; Bakke et al., 2014). In this framework, the state derives its legitimacy not only from a monopoly over the means of violence and territorial control but also from its provision of public goods and services. Under this social contract, in return, the population consents to live under state rule, complies with the state's laws, and does not engage in violence against it (Lee et al., 2014). If the government provides collective goods, it wins the people's hearts and minds by convincing them that it is working in their best interest (Andersen et al., 2014). Moreover, the state capacity literature also argues that having a strong state bureaucracy, the ability to not only provide resources but also extract taxes, is important to people's perceptions of the state.

---

[6] In Rio de Janeiro, this dimension was termed "UPP Social," a clear reference to the "social" component of the UPP strategy. The social component, however, did not live up to expectations, in part due to lack of funding, consistency, and community outreach.

Following this logic, allegiance to the state should follow from the *strength of the presence of state institutions and bureaucracy*.

A third approach argues that it is not state military control or institutional presence but rather individuals' lived experiences with the state that determine their attitudes toward the state. The case of Rio de Janeiro, once again, provides valuable insights in this regard. The new police units and social programs in marginalized communities were designed to establish new interactions between state agents and residents. In contrast with previous experiences of police violence and corrupt politics, under this plan, state agents were instructed to treat residents as bearers of rights. At the same time, the "permanent" presence of the state – through police units and social services – was intended to change people's expectations: Residents living in peripheral areas were used to seeing the state come in and out of their communities and, therefore, expected the state agents to leave, truncating the shadow of the future and cooperation with the state (Axelrod, 1984).

The community police experiment fell short of expectations. The inability of the state to change the perception of an "expiration date" was an important element in the inability of state agents to gain the allegiance of the population (Israel de Souza, 2017). In other contexts, how the state rules has been linked to levels of support for the state and citizens' sense of loyalty toward it. It has generally been posited that "good" or democratic governance can be a source of state legitimacy (Gilley, 2006). For example, exposure to corrupt practices by state agents has been associated with lower levels of support for state institutions and the political system across Latin American and in the former Soviet Union (Seligson, 2002; Bakke et al., 2014).

In this sense, it is not the existence of the state but the *performance* by the state that matters; not the availability of institutions but their quality; not macro indicators of capacity but micro-experiences of individuals' lived experiences with the state. These personal, quotidian interactions with the state leave impressions that are sticky and endure over time. Individuals form their attitudes toward the state not necessarily based on sociotropic perceptions but on personal experiences, based on how the state performs for them: whether it provides improvements in their own security, whether it betters their living conditions, whether it provides them public goods, and, critically, whether it treats individuals well during their interactions with the state bureaucracy and security forces; that is, whether it treats them without discrimination or corruption. This approach puts the individuals' own, lived experiences at the heart of their attitudes. It suggests that if a police officer or bureaucrat or other agents of the state treats individuals with prejudice or in a discriminatory way, this will influence their views of the state, potentially more so than perceptions of national-level indicators of state capacity or performance.

This third approach predicts that people's attitudes will be determined by their *individual, personal, lived experiences with the state*.

We test these hypotheses in the context of contemporary Colombia. As we discussed previously, the Colombian government has been historically weak, incapable of governing large parts of its own territory, absent from much of the country, and, as a result, has often outsourced security and governance to nonstate actors. Its military capacity also has not, until very recently, proven sufficiently strong to eliminate or defeat the illegal nonstate actors (Waldmann, 2007, 72). Plan Colombia and President Uribe's security policies significantly strengthened the military, weakening the guerrillas sufficiently to open the door to successful negotiations under President Santos. After four years of negotiating, a "no" vote on a referendum for peace, and a final framework that ultimately passed Colombia's Congress, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels began to disarm and demobilize in January 2017. With their demobilization, the state has begun a significant push to enhance state capacity and build up the state across territories of Colombia, especially in those most affected by the armed conflict. Colombia thus offers a rich environment to study attitudes toward the state; they vary significantly across space and individuals. Understanding these attitudes is critical to contemporary policymaking.

DATA

To provide a test of our hypotheses, we used public opinion data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) for the years 2005–2014. Since respondents in these surveys are "nested" within municipalities, we merged the survey data with municipal level information. This enables us to explore the impact of not only individual factors but also contextual ones such as state territorial control and administrative presence.

LAPOP surveys provide a nationally representative sample of adults. However, given the geographic distribution of the population, it likely provides better information on the opinions and attitudes of citizens in areas with comparatively higher levels of state capacity, and less information on the small and rural municipalities with lower levels of state capacity. Despite these limitations, the LAPOP survey data provide the highest quality, national-level survey data collected in regular time intervals from which to gauge individuals' attitudes toward the state in Colombia.

Allegiance to the State

To measure allegiance to the state we constructed an index based on questions asking respondents about their level of trust in state institutions.[7] Factor analysis on responses to questions about the level of trust in certain state institutions confirmed that these tend to be organized along one dimension. We also constructed a simple additive index based on the same questions. For this additive index, each component of the index was assigned an equal weight. Given the high correlation between the two indices, we used the additive index for the analyses presented in Table 4.1.[8] To test the robustness of our results, we used two alternative indicators of allegiance to the state: (1) to what extent do you respect the institutions in the country? (2) to what extent do you support the political system of the country? Using these alternative measures of the outcome variable provided results that were comparable to those derived using the trust index.

To analyze the individual-level determinants of allegiance to the state, we constructed several variables to capture the three approaches described earlier.

Territorial Control and Military Presence

To measure territorial control, we use data from Matanock and Garcia (2017). In contrast to other measures of presence, Matanock and Garcia use patterns of violent actions to establish if a municipality is under state or nonstate actor

---

[7] We used questions inquiring about a respondent's level of trust in the justice system, Congress, the armed forces, and the national government. Although LAPOP asks questions about other institutions, trust levels in these institutions were consistently asked about between 2004–2014.

[8] The correlation between both indices is 0.99. To test for the robustness of our results, we also ran the models with the index derived from factor analysis. Results were consistent regardless of the index employed.

(guerrilla or paramilitary) control. From their data, which covers the period between 2002 and 2009, we constructed a dummy variable indicating if a municipality was under state control. As an alternative indicator, we developed a categorical variable distinguishing between municipalities in which the state exercised uninterrupted control since 2002, ones in which it gained control after 2002, ones in which it lost control after 2002, and municipalities in which the state never had control during this timeframe. Although these indicators can capture overall dynamics of territorial control reasonably well, they cannot completely capture the temporal variation in territorial control by state and nonstate actors.

To capture changes in military and police presence, we exploit the fact that the survey data used in our analyses were gathered during or after the implementation of the Uribe administration's (2002–2010) democratic security policy. This policy sought to reestablish state control over all municipalities, particularly those with low state presence and those under the control of nonstate armed actors. As part of this policy, the government reinforced the police presence in specific municipalities. We use a dummy variable provided by Cortés et al. (2012) to capture which municipalities in our sample received police reinforcements as a result of this policy.

Presence and Performance of the State and Bureaucracy

To measure the strength of state institutions and bureaucracy, we rely on data from the municipal panel of CEDE (Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico, Universidad de los Andes, see Acevedo and Bornacelly, 2014). We use municipal-level measures of state extractive capacity (proportion of local government income derived from local taxes). We also use data from Fundación Social (1998) to capture the number of local government employees per 1,000 residents in 1995 as a measure of state bureaucratic capacity in the municipality.[9] As a third indicator of state presence, we follow the innovative approach of Lee and Zhang (2017) and use the Myers Index, which measures the ability of the state to collect (legible) information about local populations. The Myers Index uses errors in age data collected by censuses to proxy for a state's ability to gather information about its citizens. The index ranges from 0 (greatest legibility) to 90 (lowest legibility score). The average Myers score in the municipalities in our sample was 1.88, with a maximum of

---

[9] In future analyses, we intend to use more recent data on bureaucratic capacity of the state. In particular, we plan to use data on the number of judges and prosecutors, as well as the judicial system's efficiency.

4.69 and a lowest score of 0.48. The sample of Colombian municipalities thus has a much higher level of legibility than the average (8.21) of the cross-national sample collected by Lee and Zhang (2017).

To capture macro performance by the state in order to measure sociotropic perceptions of state capacity, we include indicators of development (infant mortality rates) and violent crime (logged homicide rate per 1,000 inhabitants), also provided in CEDE's municipal panel (Acevedo and Bornacelly, 2014).

Individual, Personal, Lived Experiences with the State

We hypothesize that personal experiences with the state should have a strong influence on people's loyalty toward state institutions. In this sense, people who have experienced corruption or discrimination by state agents or have a negative evaluation of public services should be less likely to express trust in the state. To operationalize an individual's exposure to corrupt practices, we rely on data on whether individuals had been asked by police officers for a bribe in the past twelve months.[10] To measure exposure to discrimination, we use a question indicating if the respondent had experienced discrimination in a government office. Specifically, respondents were asked: "Thinking about your experiences in the past year, did you feel discriminated against, i.e. treated differently than others, in governments offices (courts, ministries, city halls)?"[11] Perceptions of public services were gauged through questions asking respondents to use a five-point scale (very good to very bad) to rate municipal public services.

In addition to capturing state military and institutional presence, and state performance at both macro and micro levels, we also include in the analyses a standard ten-point measure of ideological self-placement. Bolstering a collective identity, ideology, or partisan preference can generate allegiance to a state, even when it does not have consolidated presence or effective performance (Migdal, 2001; Bakke et al., 2014).

---

[10] Regarding experiences of corruption, respondents were asked "Did a police officer ask for a bribe in the past 12 months." Because citizens can be exposed to corrupt practices of other government employees, we also ran the analyses with another measure of exposure to corrupt practices from a broader category of state officers, i.e. public employees ("In the past 12 months, has a public employee asked for a bribe?") Results were similar across the two measures of exposure to corruption.

[11] Since the questions about discrimination were asked only in recent years, we ran a model with and without this variable.

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

In this chapter, we are interested in exploring how individual allegiance to the state – measured as trust in state institutions – is impacted both by individual factors and also characteristics of the municipalities in which respondents are "nested." The nature of the data and our substantive interest warrant the use of multilevel models (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). As described previously, our data are measured at two levels: individual and municipal.

To test if a multilevel model is appropriate for our analysis, i.e., if the multilevel character of the data should not be ignored, we initially ran an unconditional model (see Model 1, Table 4.1). Since the variance components of both levels are significant, this indicates that there is variance in trust in state institutions at both levels (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). While this suggests that a multilevel model is an appropriate empirical strategy, it is important to highlight that the individual-level variance is the biggest component of the total variance and thus we have the greatest leverage to analyze factors at the individual level.[12] In a next step, we ran four random-intercept models (2–5) to account for the impact of individual- and municipal-level determinants of trust in state institutions.

RESULTS

The results of our models presented in Table 4.1 offer evidence to support our intuition that individual lived experiences with the state carry a great deal of weight in people's attitudes and allegiance to the state. Consistently, across all models, different measures of interactions with the state – be it personal experiences of police or bureaucrat corruption, personal experiences of discrimination at state offices, or personal experiences with state public services – are strongly correlated with trust in state institutions.

As seen in Figure 4.1, experiencing an act of corruption – in this case, being asked by a police officer for a bribe – is associated with less trust in state institutions. A similar effect can be observed in cases in which a person has experienced discrimination by a government officer (Figure 4.2). In both cases, the difference between experiencing corruption or discrimination by a state officer or not is of a magnitude of approximately 0.3 points. People's views about the quality of their public services are also strongly associated with the trust they

---

[12] The inter-class correlation (ICC) = 0.052.

TABLE 4.1 *Results of Multilevel Models*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Fixed effects					
Municipal level					
Constant	4.301***	4.432***	4.403***	3.652***	3.926***
	(0.0381)	(0.175)	(0.183)	(0.197)	(0.175)
Infant mortality rate		0.00944*	0.00913*	0.0101*	0.00995*
		(0.00423)	(0.00434)	(0.00437)	(0.00451)
Police reinforcement		−0.541***	−0.543***	−0.578***	−0.577***
		(0.144)	(0.141)	(0.149)	(0.148)
Municipal bureaucracy		−0.0193	−0.0192	−0.0158	−0.0159
		(0.0157)	(0.0154)	(0.0165)	(0.0165)
Municipal taxation capacity		−0.721***	−0.727***	−0.771***	−0.774***
		(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.216)	(0.216)
Homicide rate		−0.0479*	−0.0448*	−0.0544*	−0.0531*
		(0.0222)	(0.0222)	(0.0227)	(0.0233)
State control		0.0101		0.0116	
		(0.0501)		(0.0505)	
Legibility (Myers)		0.0969**	0.103**	0.101**	0.103**
		(0.0343)	(0.0370)	(0.0347)	(0.0369)
State violence		0.194	0.192	0.245	0.245
		(0.112)	(0.114)	(0.128)	(0.129)
State control:					
State loses control			0.0463		0.0159
			(0.0861)		(0.0867)
State gains control			0.0219		0.0137
			(0.0720)		(0.0686)
State retains control			0.0452		0.0257
			(0.0619)		(0.0669)
Individual level					
Ideology		0.107***	0.107***	0.113***	0.113***
		(0.0111)	(0.0111)	(0.00980)	(0.00981)
Experience with corruption		−0.334***	−0.335***	−0.296***	−0.297***
		(0.0379)	(0.0376)	(0.0434)	(0.0432)

(*continued*)

TABLE 4.1 (*continued*)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Fixed effects					
Perceptions of public services		−0.266*** (0.0197)	−0.266*** (0.0196)	−0.255*** (0.0207)	−0.255*** (0.0206)
Experience of discrimination				0.283*** (0.0584)	0.283*** (0.0587)
Variance components					
Individual level	1.838*** (0.0216)	1.671*** (0.0156)	1.671*** (0.0156)	1.655*** (0.0162)	1.655*** (0.0162)
Municipal level	0.102*** (0.00849)	0.0187*** (0.00369)	0.0181*** (0.00382)	0.0155*** (0.00346)	0.0154*** (0.00351)
Observations	15,176	8,532	8,532	7,430	7,430

Robust standard errors in parentheses, $*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$; $***p < 0.001$



FIGURE 4.1 Experience with Corrupt Officials and Trust in State Institutions (95% CI)

have in state institutions. The lower their evaluation of local public services, the lower trust they express in the state. All other things being equal, the difference between having a very positive and a very negative evaluation of public services corresponds to a 1.0 point difference in the index (see Figure 4.3).



FIGURE 4.2 Experience of Discrimination and Trust in State Institutions (95% CI)



FIGURE 4.3 Quality of Public Services and Trust in State Institutions (95% CI)

The results of municipal-level variables offer some preliminary evidence that state control may not – in and of itself – guarantee allegiance toward the state. Either as a dummy variable (models 2 and 4) or as a categorical variable (models 3 and 5), municipalities controlled by the state or where the state gained control after 2002 were not significantly different from other municipalities in their levels of trust toward state institutions. We should take these results, however, with a great deal of caution. First, our variables of control measure control over longer periods of time (2002–2009) and not by year. Furthermore, the nature of our sample means that the accuracy of our estimates for areas with less state control and capacity is lower.

Municipalities that experienced a surge in police presence as a result of the Uribe administration's democratic security policy also displayed, on average, lower levels of trust in state institutions. The surge in police forces occurred in municipalities that had some police presence but were not completely under state control. The average lower level of trust in state institutions in these municipalities may be reflecting initial increases in conflict-related violence, particularly in municipalities that received reinforcements early in the program (Cortés et al., 2012). In this context, it is hard for civilians to determine if the state would establish full control and how long it would remain in the area. In other words, the shadow of the future was uncertain. Thus, changing allegiance from a nonstate actor to the state may not have occurred automatically (see Figure 4.4).

Counterintuitive results also can be seen regarding the levels of municipal development and state capacity. Higher levels of development (low infant mortality rate) are correlated with lower levels of trust in state institutions (see Figure 4.5). The extractive capacity of the municipal government – measured as the proportion of local income derived from municipal taxes – is also negatively associated with trust in state institutions. The more the local government can effectively tax its population, the lower the levels of trust in institutions. Similarly, counterintuitive results can be observed in the relationship between legibility and trust in state institutions. The coefficient indicates that lower levels of legibility (i.e., higher values in the Myers Index) are positively associated with trust in state institutions.

Our results do not necessarily mean that increasing state capacity, control, legibility, and levels of development lead to lower levels of trust in the state. It is possible that residents in areas with more effective state presence (for instance, in urban areas) have, on average, lower trust in state institutions because their expectations of the state, for example, in the provision and quality of public services, is much higher than in areas in which the state had been historically absent. We also highlight again that the small sample



FIGURE 4.4 Democratic Security and Trust in State Institutions (95% CI)



FIGURE 4.5 Development and Trust in State Institutions (95% CI)



FIGURE 4.6 Ideology and Trust in State Institutions (95% CI)

size and variance on municipal-level factors that we are able to exploit here considerably limit the inferences we can derive from our results, and we urge additional research on municipal-level correlates of trust in the state.

We included ideological self-placement as a control in our models, which unsurprisingly we find to be associated with allegiance to the state. Until recently, ideological self-placement in Colombia did not necessarily correlate with views about economic policy or social issues but strongly reflected people's views about the armed conflict (Albarracín, 2013). People self-identifying as right-wing expressed stronger support for a military solution to conflict. It is therefore not surprising that they express more confidence in state institutions (see Figure 4.6). Future research should seek to understand how ideological and partisan identities influence trust in state institutions.

CONCLUSION

As countries emerge from civil conflict, enhancing the capacity of the state is a key challenge. There are many dimensions to state capacity. One is the state's ability to command the loyalty of its people such that they look to the state rather than to illegal nonstate actors for security and public goods, so that the state becomes the dominant source of authority and governance in the territory. This chapter has sought to uncover the determinants of such loyalty: when the state will have the people's hearts and minds and when it will not. We rely on survey data to evaluate whether military control, institutional presence, or government performance matter to individuals' attitudes toward the state. While territorial control, bureaucratic presence, and macro performance undoubtedly matter to perceptions of the state, this chapter highlights the role of personal experiences. Specifically, individuals seem to base their attitudes toward the state in part based on their own experiences with corruption, discrimination, and the state's customer service. The findings therefore underscore the benefits of improving the state's interface with its citizenry. Given the centrality of local governments in the provision of public goods, their greater proximity to citizens, and direct impact in their daily lives, it is important to strengthen the capacity of local authorities in post-conflict Colombia: "all politics is local." If local authorities are incapable, negligent, or involved in criminal or corrupt practices, many of the central state's reconstruction and development policies may be undermined and may not lead to higher levels of trust in the state.

We find that populations not under state control during the conflict are not necessarily "lost," needing to be re-won, but rather that they may be more supportive of the state than the civil war literature would lead us to believe. Indeed, postwar allegiances tend to be more fluid than is often believed (Daly, 2018). That those on the political right have greater loyalty to the state indicates that the state may need to do more legitimacy-building with the political left irrespective of individuals' evaluations of the state's presence and performance. The chapter demonstrates the merits of measuring state capacity as citizen allegiance and indicates that the Colombian state should prioritize places in which levels of trust are low by improving citizens' lived experiences with the state.

REFERENCES

Acevedo, K., and Bornacelly, I. (2014). Panel Municipal del CEDE. *Documentos CEDE*, Number 26. Bogota: CEDE-Universidad de los Andes.

Albarracín, J. (2013). "Ideological Self-Placement and Issue Attitudes in Colombian Public Opinion." Presented at the 2013 Conference of the Latin American Studies Association, May 30–June 1, Washington, DC.

Andersen, D., Møller, J., Rørbæk, L. L., and Skaaning, S. E. (2014). "State Capacity and Political Regime Stability." *Democratization* 21 (7), 1305–1325.

Arjona, Ana. (2017). *Rebelocracy. Social Order in the Colombian Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Arjona, A., Kasfir, N. and Mampilly, Z. (2015). *Rebel Governance in Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Axelrod, R. (1984). *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.

Bakke, K. M. (2011) "After the War Ends: Violence and Viability of Post-Soviet Unrecognized States," in Caspersen, N. and Stansfield, G. (eds.) 90–109. *Unrecognized States in the International System*. London: Routledge.

Bakke, K. M., O'Loughlin, J., Toal, G., and Ward, M. D. (2014). "Convincing State-Nuilders? Disaggregating Internal Legitimacy in Abkhazia." *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (3), 591–607.

Beath, A. et al. (2011). Winning Hearts and Minds through Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. MIT Political Science Working Paper.

Berman, E. et al. (2011). "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq." *Journal of Political Economy* 119, 766–819.

Berwick, E., and Christia, F. (2018). "State Capacity Redux: Integrating Classical and Experimental Contributions to an Enduring Debate." *Annual Review of Political Science* 21, 71–91.

Boone, Catherine. (2003). *Political Topographies of the African State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Centeno, Miguel. (2002). *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation State in Latin America*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Cortés, D., Vargas, J. F., Hincapié, L., and Franco, M. D. R. (2012). "Seguridad Democrática, presencia de la Policía y conflicto en Colombia." *Desarrollo y Sociedad* 69, 11–32.

Daly, Sarah Zukerman. (2016). *Organized Violence after Civil War: The Geography of Recruitment in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

2018. *Voting for Victors: Why Violent Actors Win Postwar Elections*. Columbia University, unpublished manuscript.

Fearon, James D., and Latin, David. (2003). "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 75–90.

Flores-Macías, Gustavo. (2014). "Financing Security through Elite Taxation: The Case of Colombia's 'Democratic Security Taxes.'" *Studies in Comparative International Development* 49, 477–500.

Fundacion Social. (1998). *Municipios y Regiones de Colombia. Una Mirada desde la Sociedad Civil*. Bogota: Antropos.

Gilley, B. (2006). "The Determinants of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 countries." *International Political Science Review* 27 (1), 47–71.

Giraudy, Agustina, and Luna, Juan Pablo. (2017). "Unpacking the State's Uneven Territorial Reach: Evidence from Latin America," in Centeno, Miguel Angel, Kohli, Atul, and Yashar, Deborah (eds.) 93–120. *States in the Developing World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

González, Fernán. (2003). "Colapso parcial o presencia diferenciada del Estado en Colombia?: una mirada desde la historia." *Colombia Internacional* 54, 124–158.

Gupta, A. (1995). "Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State." *American Ethnologist* 22 (2), 375–402.

Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco. (2010). "Estados fallidos o conceptos fallidos?: La clasificación de las fallas estatales y sus problemas." *Revista de Estudios Sociales* 37, 87–104.

Hendrix, Cullen S. (2010). "Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (3), 273–285.

Hobbes, Thomas. (2010) [1651]. *Leviathan. Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill*. Shapiro, Ian (ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Huntington, S. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Israel de Souza, S. (2017). "The End Is Near: Shifting Police-Community-Trafficker Relations in the Olympic Favela." Paper Presented at the 2017 Conference of the Latin American Studies Association, Lima, Peru.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2006). *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kurtz, Marcus. (2013). *Latin American State Building in Comparative Perspective: Social Foundations of Institutional Order*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

LAPOP. 2005–2014. The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project, www.LapopSurveys.org.

Lee, Melissa M., Walter-Drop, Gregor, and Wiesel, John. (2014). "Taking the State (Back) Out? Statehood and the Delivery of Collective Goods." *Governance* 27 (4), 636, 637.

Lee, Melissa M., and Zhang, Nan. (2017). "Legibility and the Informational Foundations of State Capacity." *Journal of Politics* 79 (1), 118–132.

Lessing, B. (2015). "Logics of Violence in Criminal Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59 (8), 1486–1516.

Levi, M. (1988). *Of Rule and Revenue*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Luna, J. P., and Soifer, H. (2017). "Capturing Sub-National Variation in State Capacity: A Survey-Based Approach." *American Behavioral Scientist* 61 (8), 887–907.

Mampilly, Z. (2011). *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Mann, M. (1984). "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results." *European Journal of Sociology* 25 (2). 185–213.

Matanock, A. M., and García-Sánchez, M. (2017). "Does Counterinsurgent Success Match Social Support? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Colombia." *The Journal of Politics* 80 (3), 800–814.

Menéndez, M. (1983). *Voices from El Salvador*. San Francisco, CA: Solidarity Publications.

Migdal, J. (1988). *Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

(2001). *State and Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

(2009). "Researching the State," in Lichbach, M. I. and Zuckerman, A. (eds.) 162—192. *Comparative Politics. Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

North, D., and Weingast, B. (1989). "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *Journal of Economic History* 49 (4), 803–832.

Palacios, M., and Safford, F. (2002). *Colombia: país fragmentado, Sociedad dividida. Su historia*. Bogota: Editorial Norma.

Robinson, J. A. (2013). "Colombia: Another 100 Years of Solitude?" *Current History* 112 (751), 43–48.

Scott, J. (1998). *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Seligson, M. A., (2002). "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *The Journal of Politics* 64 (2), 408–433.

Slater, D. (2010). *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Soifer, H. (2015). *State Building in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Soifer, H., and Vom Hau, M. (2008). "Unpacking the Strength of the State: The Utility of State Infrastructural Power." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 43, 219–230.

Soifer, H., and Vieira III, E. A. (2019). "The Internal Armed Conflict and State Capacity: Institutional Reforms and the Effective Exercise of Authority," in Hillel, David Soifer, and Vergara, Alberto (eds.) 109–131. *Politics after Violence: Legacies of the Shining Path Conflict in Peru*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Steenbergen, M. R., and Jones, B. S. (2002). "Modeling Multilevel Data Structures." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (1), 218–237.

Thies, C. G. (2005). "War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3), 451–465.

Tilly, C. (1990). *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Tse-Tung, Mao. (2005 [1961]). *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Mineola: Dover Publications.

Valentino, B. (2004). *Final Solutions*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Waldmann, P. (2007) "Is There a Culture of Violence in Colombia?" *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 1, 61–75.

Wickham-Crowley, T. (1992). *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.